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ABSTRACT 
 
The years following the Second World War are those of greatest economic growth in 
Europe. If the countries of the Iberian Peninsula, neutral in the conflict and ruled by 
dictatorial regimes, enjoyed that growth and had participated in the convergence 
phenomenon, Ireland, also neutral but democratic, was not able to converge to the 
developed world. Since 1973, with petroleum crashes, the process of growth has slowed in 
Europe, but it was only after 1985 that Ireland began to grow at impressive rates. We 
review, in an economic history perspective, the implications of the institutional 
environment and the economic policy decisions. We also address the consequences and 
plausible explanations for the different growth paths of those countries and revisit the 
puzzle of slow Irish growth until the middle eighties. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain provide a good case to study economic growth because they all 
had a low per capita income in the 1930s, followed by quite different growth paths: 
Portugal and Spain experienced fast growth until 1973, slowing after that date, while 
Ireland’s fastest growth period was after 1985. In this paper we will examine these paths 
side by side, while citing the range of literature addressing the subject.   
 
We review, in an economic history perspective, the implications of the institutional 
environment and the economic policy decisions: political regimes and institutions, 
industrial policy, trade policy and fiscal and monetary policy. We also address the 
consequences and plausible explanations for the different growth paths of those countries 
and revisit the puzzle of slow Irish growth until the middle eighties, suggesting some 
explanations for the fact. 
 
In Section 2 we describe, on a comparative basis, the different periods of economic growth 
in the three countries, paying special attention to the possible relationship between policies, 
institutions and economic growth. Then, in Section 3, we review the main growth 
accounting studies that compare these countries, trying to distinguish the main sources of 
different growth rates. Next, in Section 4, we re-address the well-known puzzle about Irish 
growth. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude. With this, we wish to create a comparable body 
of reference regarding growth paths over the greater part of the twentieth century in these 
countries. 
 
 
2. The economic history of three peripheral countries in Europe: Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain 
 
2.1 Political and Economic instability (1930s and 40s) 
 
The late twenties and early thirties were years of disruption in all these countries. Portugal 
and Spain faced a political transition to dictatorial regimes, although this transition was 
much more pronounced in Spain, with its Civil War (1933-39). But the new regimes in the 
Iberian countries had the same economic motivation: to solve the economic and financial 
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problems of the countries and their governments. Ireland had a democratic regime but 
gained political independence from the United Kingdom during the twenties, going 
through difficult social traumas in the process (César das Neves (1996), Ó Gráda e K. 
O’Rourke (1996), Prados de Escosura and Sanz (1996)).  
 
Portugal and Spain adopted a new form of labor organization aimed at avoiding social 
conflict. The new Corporations were organizations that tried to reconcile employees’ and 
employers’ needs and ambitions. In Spain the Ley basica de trabajo (Basic Labor Law ) 
(1939) forbade labor unions and enforced affiliation in the state organizations. In Portugal 
the Ordem Corporativa1 (Corporative Order) forbade strikes and lockout and fomented the 
direct negotiation between employers and employees. Ireland had free labor organizations. 
A summary of the main policies followed during the period in analysis is made in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Summary of Policies during the whole period 
 Political regime and institutions Industrial Policy Trade Policy Fiscal/Monetary Policy 
IRELAND 
Democracy. Free 
labor unions and 
centralized wage 
negotiation. 
Industrial Conditioning (started 
in 1932). Restrictions to FDI. 
Large State-owned sector. Large 
incentives to FDI in the 80’s. 
Protectionist until 
late 40’s. 
Anglo-Irish 
Agreement (1948). 
Free-Trade 
Agreement with 
England (1966). EEC 
(1973). 
Keynesian Policy in social 
issues: housing, health and 
education. 1970’s: reform of the 
education sector. 
Fiscal consolidation in middle 
80’s. 
PORTUGAL 
Autocracy (until 
1974). Non-free 
labor unions and 
decentralized wage 
negotiations. 
Industrial Conditioning (started 
in 1931, ended in 1974). 
Restrictions to FDI. Minor 
intervention until 1945; 
intervention on a development 
plans basis, after 1945. Few 
state owned enterprises until 
1974. Nationalizations after the 
Revolution. Incentives to FDI 
after 80’s. 
Import Substitution 
from middle 40’s to 
late 50’s. 
Protectionist until 
late 50’s. 
Colonial Act (1930).
EFTA (1958). 
EEC (1986). 
Neoclassical Policy: low 
inflation and Budget equilibrium.
After Revolution (1974), 
macroeconomic instability took 
place: inflation, public and 
external deficit. IMF 
interventions. Structural Reforms 
after middle 80’s.  
SPAIN 
Autocracy (until 
1975). Non-free 
labor unions and 
centralized wage 
negotiations. 
Industrial Conditioning (started 
in 1939, ended in 1975). 
Restrictions to FDI. Large state 
owned sector. Incentive policies 
and privatisations in the 60’s. 
Incentives to FDI after 80’s. 
Import Substitution 
from late 30’s to late 
50’s. Protectionist 
until late 50’s or 
later. 
EEC (1986). 
Nominal desiquilibrium: 
High inflation and external 
deficits. Stabilization Plan 
(1959). After transición inflation 
and deficit returned. Structural 
Reforms after middle 80’s. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The Corporative Order was based on the Constitution (1933), Main Law of labor (1933) (Estatuto do 
trabalho nacional) and special legislation. 
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 The Great Depression and Free Trade collapse: How Ireland, Spain and Portugal dealt 
with these changes. 
 
It can be said that the consequences of the Great Depression were more harmful to Ireland 
(the smallest and the most open economy of the three) than to Spain, and worse in Spain 
than in Portugal. The Spanish government implemented a fiscal contraction at the time of 
the crisis that is thought to have worsened the situation. In Portugal, Salazar’s government 
had maintained the belief in budget equilibrium, which led to a slight decrease in public 
expenditures. However, simultaneously, it lowered interest rates, which benefited 
investment and public deficit (Prados de Escosura and Sanz (1996), Valério (1982)). 
 
In response to the world trade crisis, these countries adopted protective measures that 
included industrial conditioning2, high tariffs, quotas and restriction to foreign direct 
investment (FDI)3. The industrial conditioning laws restricted the entry and localization of 
enterprises to those authorized by the government. On one hand, this avoided the usual 
mergers and acquisitions in a free entry economy. On the other hand, it did not favor 
technological progress, which is often linked with the competitive environment. 
Nevertheless, some theses point out that industrial conditioning might have had an 
important role in markets where excessive entry occurred, possibly promoting mergers and 
acquisitions. Authors who promote this view also argue that the contestability of 
concentrated markets took place. Nevertheless, the incumbent firms usually did not 
promote innovation and development in order to deter new entrants, but argued with 
excessive capacity (Confraria (1992)), although some cases of innovation and process or 
quality improvement might have occurred. 
 
Aside from the domestic protectionism, firms in all three countries were protected by high 
tariffs, and in the Portuguese case also by the Colonial Act (Acto Colonial, 1930), aimed at 
keeping the colonial market free of foreign firms. The Lei de Nacionalização do Capital 
(Capital Nationalization Law) in Portugal, the Ley de Ordenación e Defensa de la 
                                                 
2 The Portuguese industrial conditioning regime began in 1931, the Irish in 1932 and the Spanish in 1939. 
3 Note that some protective measures were taken elsewhere around the world at this time. As a 
consequence, value of trade worldwide fell more than 50% between 1920 and 1932 (Feinstein, Temin and 
Toniolo, 1997), with the greatest decline being between 1929 and 1933. According to Kindleberger 
(1973), the volume of trade in 1933 was only 33% of that in 1929. About protective measures taken after 
the Great Depression, see also Aldcroft (1987, pp.33 and 45).  
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Industria Nacional (Law for the organization and defense of national Industry), in Spain 
and the Manufactures Acts, in Ireland, strongly limited foreign investment.  
 
There is, however, a remarkable distinction between the strategy of Spain and Ireland, on 
the one hand, and Portugal on the other: the government intervention. In Portugal the 
government did not intervene in the industrialization process until 1945 (Lains, 1994). On 
the contrary, in the other two countries the government intervened in the process. In Spain, 
for example, the Ley de Protección de las Nuevas Industrias de Interés Nacional (Law for 
protection of the new strategic industries) (1939) gave incentives to the creation of new 
industries and Instituto Nacional de Industria (the National Industry Institute) (1941) 
created a diversified group of new state-owned enterprises4. In Ireland, a large number of 
state-owned industries were created mainly in selected sectors: communications, 
transports, tourism and industry. This institutional and legal environment created small 
privately owned firms, which could not benefit from scale economies (Braña et al. (1984), 
César das Neves (1994, 1996), Harrison (1978), Leddin and Walsh (1998), Prados de la 
Escosura and Sanz (1996), Marques (1988)). 
 
 
The Second World War: Consequences and Development Strategies 
 
This is a period of supply problems in these countries, a situation which drove the 
governments to strive for self-sufficiency. With the end of the conflict, Spain ended up 
with no supplier of modern technology, not only because of the collapse of its former 
supplier (Nazi Germany), but also because of the UN embargo (1946). This fact, coupled 
with a depreciation of the national currency (Peseta), prevented Spain from importing 
intermediate goods that were needed to implement the import substitution strategy. In 
Ireland, the problem was not so different. The main supplier of technology (the United 
Kingdom) was now a destroyed country. Besides this, the controlled prices of agricultural 
goods in the UK had reduced the income of Irish peasants and their production, as well. 
Portugal had quite a different story to tell: although its economy felt some technology 
needs, its exports (mainly minerals and textiles) rose considerably during the war, 
increasing the accumulation of capital in the economy (Braña, Buesa and Molero (1984), 
                                                 
4 This began early in thirties as a substitution of imports strategy as part of the war effort by the 
Nationalist faction. 
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César das Neves (1994, 1996), Harrison (1978), Leddin and Walsh (1998), Prados de la 
Escosura and Sanz (1996), Marques (1988), Ó Gráda and O’Rourke (1996)). 
 
The three countries felt inflationary pressures toward the end of the forties, caused by the 
restrictions on the supply side. While Portugal used its gold and foreign currency reserves 
accumulated during the war to reach equilibrium in markets with excessive demand in 
order to decrease inflation, Spain and Ireland liberalized international trade, permitting a 
gradual increase in imports in the former and a more significant increase in imports in the 
latter. However, some thought that the Anglo-Irish Commercial Agreement (1948), which 
opened the English market to the Irish agricultural goods, was the answer to all Irish 
problems. On the contrary, the agreement proved disastrous to Ireland, through the 
evolution of terms of trade (César das Neves (1996), Ó Gráda and O’Rourke (1996) and 
Prados de la Escosura and Sanz (1996)). 
 
Responses to domestic stress also differed. The Spanish government abandoned its autarky 
strategy and tried to implement an export-oriented model of industrialization (Delgado 
(1987), Harrison (1978), Prados de Escosura and Sanz (1996)). On the contrary, Portugal 
and Ireland did not promote exports. Portugal embarked on an import-substitution model 
of industrialization, based on the accumulated gold and currency reserves (Mateus (1998), 
Rosas (1990)). Ireland believed that the core of its problems resided in the agricultural 
sector, leading the government to raise tariffs and implement other protectionist measures 
(Ó Gráda and O’Rourke (1996)).  
 
A remarkable difference between the Iberian countries and Ireland was that this country 
promoted explicit Keynesian policies, giving rise to social investment in schools, hospitals 
and subsidized housing policies. In fact, Ireland maintained a rate of social investment 
quite high for that time, while the Portuguese government promoted nominal equilibrium, 
as it thought that it was the best environment for investment (César das Neves (1996), Ó 
Gráda and O’Rourke (1996), Prados de Escosura and Sanz (1996)). We can also say that 
Spain occupied a middle ground between classical and Keynesian policies, as it intervened 
in the industrialization process but did not promote explicit classical policies. 
  
European reconstruction following the Second World War demonstrated the need for some 
planning of the economic activity. Portugal, with a new industrial policy, needed to plan its 
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development, as well as to regulate the state intervention. In 1945 the government had 
passed the Lei para o Fomento e Reorganização industrial (Law for Development and 
Industrial Reorganization), aimed at financing infrastructures. The Primeiro Plano de 
Fomento (1953-58) (First Development Plan) promoted infrastructures and the creation of 
firms in the industrial sector (Lains (1994)). While in Portugal the main motivation to 
Planning was the need to implement the new industrial policy, in Ireland it was the need to 
manage the funds from the Marshall Plan. The first planning experience was not entirely 
effective but did advance the move against the protectionist policies and toward the 
adoption of export-oriented policies (Ó Gráda and O’Rourke (1996)). Spain, which had 
begun its industrial program earlier, did not need to implement planning because it did not 
benefit from the Marshall Plan. 
 
Between 1950 and 1960 there were more significant structural changes in the Iberian 
countries than in Ireland. The most significant indicators were the acceleration of GDP and 
productivity growth, the increase in investment and decreased inflation (which fell below 
the two-digit threshold), the decreasing share of agricultural production, and employment 
in the total stocks. Ireland suffered from massive emigration, and this decade was a disaster 
in terms of economic growth (César das Neves, (1996), Harrison, (1978), Leddin and 
Walsh, (1998), Merigo, (1982), Prados de La Escosura and Sanz, (1996)).  
 
The two Iberian countries had restructured their industrial conditioning systems (Portugal 
in 1952 and Spain in 1963). The efforts were to streamline the bureaucratic process and 
urge the decision maker to focus on the technical aspects to guarantee a minimum scale. 
Spain created a more effective incentive policy with the implementation of preferential 
localization zones, industrial polygons, fiscal and economic benefits, restricted 
discretionary administrative decisions, and privatization of its state-owned sector (Braña, 
Buesa and Molero (1984), César das Neves (1996)). 
 
The sixties were the years of openness to trade and of integration in international markets, 
while the most respectable economic institutions (World Bank, OECD and NBER) 
criticized the import-substitution policies (Mateus (1998)). 
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2.2 Growth and Integration: The Iberian “tigers”  
 
Spain, Portugal and Ireland joined some important international organizations. Spain 
joined the IMF and World Bank in 1958 and the OEEC in 1959. Portugal joined the OECD 
in 1948, EFTA in 1958, IMF and World Bank in 1960 and GATT in 1962. Ireland signed a 
free-trade association with England in 1966 and joined the EEC in 1973. It can be observed 
that Portugal and Ireland went deeper into the process of integration than did Spain, as only 
EFTA and EEC are free trade associations. 
 
The result was an increase in exports and in FDI, as well as in the openness of these 
three economies. For instance, the openness ratio increased approximately 11% between 
1960 and 1970 in Portugal and Spain and more than 40% between 1945 and the mid-
sixties in Ireland5 (César das Neves (1996), Prados de La Escosura and Sanz (1996), 
Leddin and Walsh (1998)). 
 
There were some remarkable structural differences between Portugal and Spain. While 
Portugal promoted nominal and real equilibrium (in part helped by emigration and 
emigrants’ remittances), Spain had serious problems with its inflation rate and its external 
deficit. To solve its problems this country sought help from the USA and promoted a 
Stabilization Plan (1959), which was quite effective (César das Neves (1996), Prados de 
La Escosura and Sanz (1996)). 
 
Portugal witnessed high emigration for social and political reasons and had to contend with 
the Colonial War (1961-74), which was a great financial burden (César das Neves (1994)).  
 
The openness of the economies, the FDI, and some structural reforms permitted annual 
average per capita growth rates of 7% in Spain and Portugal and 4% in Ireland. What is 
puzzling is why Ireland did not experience faster growth when the conditions were 
theoretically favorable and quite similar to its Iberian counterparts. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Openness ratio =(IMPORTS+EXPORTS)/GDP. 
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2.3.  Crisis and Integration: the Celtic “tiger” 
 
In the seventies the world was affected by oil shocks, which seriously damaged non-
producers. In the same period Iberian countries faced the political transition to democratic 
regimes, which exacerbated the difficulties.  
 
After a non-violent transition, the structural debilities of the Spanish economy were the 
same as before because lobby pressures had stopped the liberalization. In the mid-seventies 
Spain had a centralized economy. Although the transition in Portugal was also peaceful, 
the revolution period had profound consequences on the economic structure of the country. 
In fact, a great share of the productive sector was nationalized in 1975. In addition, the 
rapid decolonization caused massive immigration: nearly half a million people returned to 
Portugal, placing tremendous pressures on the society (César das Neves (1996), Prados de 
la Escosura and Sanz (1996), Merigo (1982)). These factors are thought to have influenced 
a higher volatility in economic growth rates in Portugal than in Spain during this period 
(Amaral (1996)). 
 
The economic adjustment to democratic regimes triggered a change in industrial and 
earnings structures, through the beginning of the state social security system and through 
the introduction of the minimum wage and controlled prices. These reforms and the first 
oil shock worsened the public and external deficits in the two countries. 
 
Weak governments following the Portuguese Revolução dos Cravos and during the 
Spanish transición agreed on the creation of very rigid labor laws. Nevertheless, labor 
market rigidities led to different outcomes in Portugal and Spain. Wage levels had 
decreased in Portugal and unemployment increased in the latter. The wage formation 
system and the definition of working conditions and collective bargaining are often pointed 
to as the reasons for this divergence, as they were centralized in Spain and extremely 
decentralized in Portugal (Amaral (1996)). 
 
While Portugal and Spain saw hard times during the regime transitions, Ireland deepened 
its economic integration and liberalization. However, the Irish government’s response to 
the oil shock included a fiscal expansion, which increased the public debt (Ó Gráda and 
O’Rourke (1996)). 
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 We describe in the next two paragraphs the economic measures taken to deal with the 
crisis. 
  
In Spain the main political measures were an interventionist revenue policy (moderate 
wage growth, Peseta's depreciation, progressive taxation), an accommodative fiscal policy 
and restrictive monetary policy.  The authorities implemented the reform of the declining 
sectors and the financial sector was liberalized. Although monetary policy was thought to 
be essential in controlling inflation, fiscal policy had been expansionary, increasing the 
deficit. The reforms were able to reduce inflation and to ease the external debt, but were 
not successful in relieving high unemployment and public deficit (Prados de la Escosura 
and Sanz (1996)). 
 
Portugal sought IMF intervention in its enormous imbalance in external and public 
accounts. The success of the first stabilization program was modest because high inflation 
had outstripped the nominal depreciation. A crawling-peg system, which had been 
effective in the exchange rate stabilization, was implemented. Nevertheless, the second oil 
shock caused serious damage to the external deficits. A second IMF stabilization program, 
however, proved to be quite effective and prepared the economy to join the EEC in 1986 
(César das Neves (1996) and Mateus, (1998)). 
  
By the mid-eighties, the Irish government had recognized that the expansionary fiscal 
policy was not helping the private sector and switched to contention in public budgets. 
This was quite effective in reducing the interest rate and inflation, but it had some short-
term costs in terms of employment and growth (Fuente and X. Vives (1997), Ó Gráda and 
O’Rourke (1996)). 
 
Between 1974 and 1985, Ireland clearly overtook Portugal and Spain in economic growth 
rates, with an annual average of 3.8% against 2.2% and 1.8% respectively. In the following 
years the difference between growth performances increased, although all three countries 
experienced faster growth.  
 
The adhesion of the Iberian countries to the EEC coincided with a global expansionary 
period. This favorable international environment and the macroeconomic stability turned 
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out to be the best environment for investment. In Spain the effects in the labor market were 
clear: an employment creation rate of 3% per year that reduced the unemployment rate of 
about 22% in 1975 to 16% by 1990. Nevertheless, a combination of restrictive monetary 
and returns policies coupled with an expansionary fiscal policy put pressure on interest and 
inflation rates, which worsened the public and external deficits. In Portugal the 
macroeconomic stability was accompanied by a great push for public investment in 
infrastructures and by administration reforms, increasing the confidence of economic 
agents (César das Neves (1994, 1996), Mateus (1998), Prados de Escosura and Sanz 
(1996)). 
 
Regarding nominal adjustment, Portugal and Ireland reduced their inflation rates to near 
2%, and Spain to near 5% during the nineties, but the employment costs were enormous in 
Ireland (7.5% rise in the unemployment rate) and Spain (5% rise in the unemployment 
rate) but quite moderate in Portugal (2% rise) (Mateus (1998))6. Nevertheless we can see 
some competitive effects: despite the increase in productivity, the attractiveness of Iberian 
products suffered from the appreciation of the Peseta and Escudo. The gradual wage 
increase and currency appreciation changed the competitive strengths of these two 
countries (Mateus (1998), Prados de Escosura and Sanz (1996)). One of the major 
problems of the Portuguese economy was the low qualification of its labor force and a 
specialization in low technology industries. For instance, OECD figures shows that the 
high-tech share in Portuguese exports was 3%, the lowest in Europe, against 28% in 
Ireland, the highest number in Europe (Mateus (1998)).  
 
Ireland has became an attractive destination for FDI and domestic investment, mainly 
because of the introduction of a credible fiscal policy and huge fiscal benefits for profits 
(not only profits from exports but also from all production). In addition, it accumulated 
over the past decades a stock of technically prepared human capital.  However, Ireland 
faces some inefficiencies in its fiscal policies that may not conform to European 
competition Law (Fuente and X. Vives (1997), Walsh (1999), The Economist (1997)). 
Some authors also argue that the massive entry of multinationals in its economy comes at 
the expense of some potential domestic entrants (H. Görg and E. Strobrl (2000)). 
 
                                                 
6 The explanations for these differences are often based on different labor market rigidities or wage 
bargainning. 
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During the period 1986-2001 Ireland benefited from one of the highest economic growth 
rates in the OECD, with an annual average of 6.1% against 3.5% and 3.2% for Portugal 
and Spain, respectively. The Golden Age has come to Ireland, 20 years after its Iberian 
counterparts. 
 
In Table 2 we summarize the growth rates of these countries in different periods. In Table 
3 we present the relative GDP between these countries and the USA in different years. 
 
 
Table 2 – GDP per capita Growth Rates (%) 
 1950-73 1961-73 1974-85 1986-2001
EU-15 -- 4.40 2.00 1.70 
IRELAND 3.1 4.40 3.80 6.10 
PORTUGAL 5.6 7.00 2.20 3.50 
SPAIN 5.8 7.20 1.80 3.20 
Source: Maddison (1995), European Commision (2001) 
 
Table 3 – Relative GDP per capita  (in % of USA GDP per capita) 
 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
IRELAND 48.8 51.5 36.7 39.0 42.1 45.2 50.9 76.4 
PORTUGAL 24.7 24.3 22.3 27.2 39.6 45.2 48.9 43.3 
SPAIN 45.0 32.6 25.0 30.7 49.1 52.2 55.7 55.8 
Source: Maddison (1995), Penn World Table 5.6 for 2000. 
  
In the next section we review growth accounting studies and try to summarize the sources 
of different growth paths between these three countries.  
 
 
3. Growth and Convergence Sources 
 
Traditional growth-accounting7 studies suggest that Spanish growth had a greater 
productivity increase component than did Portuguese growth, which was more capital 
intensive. Labor rarely contributed in a significant way to growth, except in the period 
1974-79 in Portugal, and in the period 1986-90 in Spain (J. César das Neves (1994), L. 
Prados de la Escosura and J.C. Sanz (1996)). 
 
                                                 
7 Growth Accounting means some accounting techniques which permit the expression of GDP growth rate as 
a function of the productive factors’ growth rates. This always has some hypothesis about the functional form 
of the Production function. See Methodological Appendix for some details. 
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Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) studied relative growth in OECD countries and concluded 
that the catching-up process (the tendency for less developed countries to experience faster 
growth due to technology transfer from developed countries) was the main source of 
convergence in all three countries (Table 4). 
 
Table 4 – Relative GDP per capita Growth Rates decomposition 
SPAIN PORTUGAL IRELAND  
1950-60 1960-73 1973-85 1950-60 1960-73 1973-85 1950-60 1960-73 1973-85 
Differential Growth  0.89 2.15 -0.31 1.27 2.46 -0.13 -1.06 -0.21 -0.26
(-) Cyclic deviation  
(-) Catch-up 
-0.15 
1.13 
0.45 
0.90 
0.22 
0.42 
0.90 
2.17 
-0.08
2.09 
-0.65 
1.37 
0.21 
0.68 
-0.22
0.96 
-0.13
0.96 
= Adjusted Growth -0.09 0.80 -0.95 -1.80 0.45 -0.85 -1.95 -0.95 -1.09
(-) Labor component  0.21 -0.11 -1.27 0.11 0.10 0.30 -0.45 -0.26 -0.4 
(-) Capital component -0.25 -0.27 -0.24 -0.10 0.13 -0.30 0.37 -0.12 -0.23
= Unexplained Growth -0.06 1.18 0.56 -1.81 0.22 -0.86 -1.87 -0.57 -0.46Note: All variables are measured in log deviations from OECD mean. The adjusted growth rate is the long-run tendency adjusted for differences
in the catching-up process. The labor component is measured by the difference between employment and population growth. The capital
component is measured by the difference between capital/GDP growth and population growth. Unexplained growth is measured as residual. See
Methodological Appendix. 
Source: Dowrick and Nguyen (1989). 
 
Until 1985 Ireland had markedly diverged from OECD growth rates, while Portugal and 
Spain had markedly converged. The contribution of production factors was minimal, but 
capital had some importance in Portugal during the period 1960 to 1973 and in Ireland in 
the first period. Labor had some importance in Ireland during the period but less in the 
Iberian countries, not only because it had a smaller share of total variation of relative GDP 
but also because in some periods it had an opposite direction to differential growth. If the 
unexplained growth could be associated with exclusive domestic total factor productivity, 
it would have contributed moderately to convergence in Spain after 1960 and to divergence 
in Portugal between 1950 and 1960 and between 1973 and 1985 and in Ireland during all 
the period. 
 
Andrés et al.’s (1992) study8 suggested that convergence, investment and human capital 
had a strong effect in Spain and Portugal, while the exports growth rate had an important 
effect in Ireland. The inflation rate is not particularly important in explaining convergence 
in these countries. 
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8 This study is based on the estimation of convergence equations. 
Fuente’s (1995) model9 explains the sources of growth and convergence in OECD 
countries, using an extension of Dowrick and Nguyen’s model (1989), in which the 
innovation rate is endogenously determined by the research and development (R&D) level 
and by the catching-up process, while explicitly incorporating the possibility for increasing 
returns. This model’s aim is to distinguish two kinds of convergence: neoclassical 
convergence, linked to the existence of decreasing returns to initial endowment; and 
catching-up convergence, linked to the adoption of new foreign-developed technologies. 
For Ireland, Portugal and Spain the results show a weak effect of R&D and factor 
accumulation between 1960 and 1988, and confirm the importance of the two convergence 
effects, especially the catching-up process.  
 
The existence of decreasing returns and technological diffusion are consistent with 
persistent differentials on income and production, if the investment rates are smaller in 
poorer countries (Op. cit.). Table 5 shows long-run values for each of the studied countries, 
which are based on actual investment rates for the period 1983-88. 
 
Table 5 – Investment rates and relative income in the long run 
Investment Rates Relative Income  
Physical 
Capital 
Human 
Capital Technology 1988 Steady-State 
Technological 
distance from 
leader (USA)  
in 1983 
SPAIN 20.5% 5.17% 0.55% -0.177 -.370 2.14 
IRELAND 22.99% 4.39% 0.82% -0.449 -.405 1.53 
PORTUGAL 20.44% 2.11% 0.32% -0.743 -.844 2.46 
Source: Fuente (1995). 
Note: Relative Income is the deviation from OECD mean in logs; Relative income in Steady-State is calculated using the model
parameters.  
 
The results are not optimistic towards the future of these countries, if the investment rates 
do not change. Nevertheless, high investment rates in technology and human capital in 
Ireland made this country the only one to benefit from a better position in the steady-state 
than in 1988, although this model does not include the period of faster growth of Ireland. 
We must caution that investment rates are calculated over the short period 1983-85, which 
may not be representative of the entire trend, as it occurs in Portugal, for instance (see 
Figure 2, above).  
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9 See Methodological Appendix for details. 
The most recent study is a simple growth accounting exercise that explicitly compares the 
three countries under consideration (Freitas (2000)), although it does not account for 
convergence effects. This suggests, in contradiction to earlier evidence, that Portuguese 
and Spanish growth depended mainly on capital accumulation, while Irish growth 
depended on Solow residual or total factor productivity. In fact, the author argues that the 
low values for Irish depreciation rates and high productivity may suggest high quality of 
factors, supported by institutional environment, education attainment and research and 
development. However, between 1994 and 1998 the Irish economy’s growth had a great 
contribution from the labor factor.  
 
Fuente and Vives (1997) compare the growth sources of Ireland with growth sources of an 
aggregate of the Iberian countries, which include human capital, research and development 
and fiscal policy effects. In the next figures we show some relevant time series data.  
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Figure 3.1. - Enrollment in secundary and 
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Figure 3.2 - Education expenditures/ GDP 
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Figure 4 - R&D expenditure/GDP ratio (%)
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 Figure 1 shows the evolution of per capita relative income. Figure 2 shows the evolution of 
the ratio of investment to GDP. Figures 3 and 4 show the evolution of school enrollment, 
investment in education and in R&D. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the ratio of public 
expenditure to GDP. 
 
 
Figure 1 needs some remarks: (1) the income differential between Spain and Portugal 
derives from earlier periods. In this period, Portugal had slightly recovered some 
differential; (2) the differential between Ireland and OECD was smaller than the 
differential of the Iberian countries until the mid-sixties, when it was passed by Spain and 
then by Portugal. In 1992, Ireland had decreased the differential to lower levels than 
Portugal and Spain. More recent data show that Irish per capita income is indeed higher 
than the European Union mean (Leddin and Wash (1998)).  
 
The ratio of investment to GDP has been considered to be one of the most important 
variables in the growth process (Fuente (1995)). Portugal has consistently showed the 
highest value for this variable, except in 1975 (see Figure 2). Nevertheless, its recent 
decrease in Ireland does not appear to have negatively affected the growth rate there. 
 
As for technological and human capital investment, Ireland has always occupied the pole 
position. In addition UNESCO data report that the proportion of university graduates in the 
labor force has remained greater in Ireland than in the other two countries from 1970 on. In 
1995 this number was 2% in Ireland against 1.1% in Spain and 0.8% in Portugal 
(UNESCO (1999)). 
 
A final important difference between Ireland and the Iberian countries is the share of 
public expenditure in GDP. Figure 5 shows that this share is sharply decreasing in Ireland 
after 1985, against an increase in tendency in Portugal and Spain. 
 
Table 6 shows the most important results of the model. 
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Table 6 – Sources of differential growth between 1970 and 1995 
 OBS PRED LAB CONV K H R&D GOV ERROR 
1970-95 1970-95 
Ireland 1.17% 1.25% -0.20% 1.34% -0.07% 0.12% -0.18% 0.25% -0.08% 
Spain &Portugal  0.33% 0.18% -0.36% 1.35% -0.06% -0.27% -0.47% -0.03% 0.16% 
Difference 0.84% 1.08% 0.16% 0.00% -0.01% 0.39% 0.29% 0.28% -0.24% 
1970-85 1970-85 
Ireland 0.39% 0.93% -0.54% 1.83% -0.05% -0.04% -0.20% -0.07% -0.54% 
Spain & Portugal  -0.10% -0.12% -0.70% 1.74% -0.18% -0.48% -0.51% -0.01% 0.02% 
Difference 0.49% 1.05% 0.16% 0.09% 0.13% 0.44% 0.31% -0.06% -0.56% 
1985-95 1985-95 
Ireland 2.34% 1.74% 0.31% 0.61% -0.10% 0.36% -0.16% 0.72% 0.61% 
Spain & Portugal  0.98% 0.62% 0.16% 0.76% 0.12% 0.05% -0.41% -0.06% 0.35% 
Difference 1.37% 1.12% 0.15% -0.15% -0.21% 0.31% 0.25% 0.78% 0.25% 
Source: Fuente e Vives (1997). 
Legend: OBS – observed differential in growth rate of GDP per capita between these countries and OECD mean; PRED – estimate of OBS;
LAB – Labor effect; CONV – convergence effect; K – Physical Capital effect; H – Human Capital effect; R&D – R&D effect; GOV – Fiscal
policy effect. See Methodological Appendix for details. 
 
The table shows a strong convergence effect (CONV), in line with all other mentioned 
studies. In contrast with Dowrick and Nguyen’s model, Ireland strongly benefited from this 
effect, which, of course, is due to the period of time under consideration. Ireland had also 
gained from an expansionary fiscal contraction10 (GOV) and from the accumulation of 
Human Capital (H), in contrast to what occurred in the Iberian countries. We could 
conclude that, with the exceptions of convergence effect and physical capital investment, 
all sources of convergence are favorable to Ireland. 
 
When the model is divided into the periods (1970-1985 and 1985-1995), it loses some 
explanatory power for the Irish case, increasing the error component and gaining 
explanatory power for the Iberian case. In the first period, only the convergence effect is 
positive in Spain and Portugal. In the second period there is a positive effect in almost all 
the factors, except in Physical Capital and R&D in Ireland and in Fiscal Policy and R&D 
in Spain and Portugal. 
  
The main conclusions of the growth accounting exercises presented in our survey suggest 
that Portugal was the country that benefited least from increases in productivity, while 
Ireland was the country where productivity and efficiency were most important. Portugal 
showed lower investment rates in technology and human capital than did Spain and 
Ireland, but higher investment rates in physical capital. All studies point to convergence 
effects as the main factor that explains growth and convergence in these countries. The 
                                                 
10 It is said that an expansionary fiscal policy that has a positive effect on GDP growth is expansionary. 
This is a phenomenon that is supported by the Ricardian Equivalence effect. For more on this, see Romer 
(1996). 
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recent fiscal intervention in Ireland seems to have been crucial in improving growth, which 
may be a good signal to the other countries. 
  
The absence of complete growth and convergence studies for the period before 1970 has 
left the puzzle unanswered: why did Ireland fail to converge until the seventies, despite the 
fact that it had all or more of the conditions to do so than its Iberian counterparts, and had 
adopted very similar structural policies? 
 
 
4. Trying to address the puzzle: why did Ireland fail to converge until the seventies 
while Portugal and Spain did? 
 
Some authors (Walsh (1993, 1999), Ó Gráda and O’Rourke (1996), Fuente and Vives 
(1997)) have tried to find reasons for the disappointing growth performance of Ireland up 
to the mid-eighties, when the main factors responsible for the current growth rates were 
already present at least from 1960 on. 
  
It is consensual that the substitution-of-imports strategy of the fifties was detrimental to 
growth. However, Iberian countries were submitted to imports-substitution policies and 
experienced faster growth. In addition, the intense liberalization of Ireland in the sixties did 
not foster growth. Ó Gráda and O’Rourke (1996) argue that tariffs were replaced by non-
trade policy measures, mainly by industrial subsidies and other incentives. This is indeed a 
factor that is associated with Ireland’s present growth. Nevertheless, Walsh (1999) pointed 
out a crucial change in incentive policy: the introduction of more sophisticated objectives 
in the firms and industry selection and extension of the reduced tax to the non-trade sector 
(financial, for instance). 
 
The tight trade link between the Irish economy and that of the United Kingdom, where 
growth rates were much lower than those of continental Europe, might be another factor 
that deterred Irish growth. However, Walsh (1993) demonstrated that after 1960 the growth 
rates in Ireland show a stronger correlation with those of OECD than those of the UK. 
 
The same author argues that emigration has decreased effective human capital stock and so 
potential growth rates in Ireland may be overestimated. Nevertheless, he observes that the 
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proportion of highly qualified emigrants had increased while total emigration decreased, 
which weakens his argument. On the other hand, it is interesting to analyze the 
composition of human capital. According to the same paper, a technological non-tertiary 
education system was created only at the beginning of the seventies. Until then, a great part 
of the educational system was controlled by the Church, which gave special attention to 
humanities and social sciences. 
 
The last theory that may explain the puzzle is associated with institutional economics11. In 
fact, Olson argues with a lack of disruptive factors, there is a strong tendency for an 
increase in the influence of lobbies. The great majority of historians agree that the agrarian 
revolutions of the XIX century mantained the same institutions and industrial and 
commercial relations in Ireland. Ó Gráda and O’Rourke argue that some Irish institutions 
supported the inefficient allocation of resources to benefit some groups in the society. They 
argue, for instance, that the wage negotiation system was detrimental to growth. Durkan12 
concluded that centralized negotiations favored high wage growth. Between 1960 and 1987 
Ireland adopted, in a discontinued form, centralized wage negotiations, provoking 
productivity losses when compared with other countries. In contrast, recently Walsh (1999) 
argued that the credible return to centralized negotiation processes had contributed to 
moderate wage growth.  
 
Nevertheless, the comparison between Ireland and Iberian countries may be interesting, as 
Spain had centralized collective bargaining but Portugal did not. Olson13 argues that 
authoritarian systems pay attention to the macroeconomic environment and avoid struggles 
between labor unions, giving rise to slow wage growth, which is one of the necessary 
growth conditions, according to Eichengreen (1996). However, decentralized negotiations 
in Portugal allowed higher volatilities in wage growth than in Spain, which means that 
wages grew more in expansions and decreased more in recessions than they did with 
Spanish centralized bargaining. This means that labor market rigidities are stronger in 
Spain than in Portugal. 
 
In spite of that, when we compare wage growth with productivity growth, it is shown that 
Ireland had labor productivity losses compared to its Iberian counterparts. The analysis of 
                                                 
11 See Ó Gráda and O’Rourke (1996), B. Eichengreen (1996). 
12 See Ó Gráda and O’Rourke (1996). 
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net productivity, defined as the growth rate of labor productivity less the growth rate of 
wages, is intuitive. The rational entrepreneurial decision must be based on net marginal 
productivity: the marginal increase in output less the marginal increase in labor costs from 
an additional unit of labor in productive activities.  
 
 
Table 7 – Average labor net productivity gains14 
1961-72 1973-85 1986-96 
Ireland -1.69% 0.44% 0.91% 
Portugal -1.16% 0.96% -0.33% 
Spain -0.04% 0.32% 0.09% 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Calculations by the author. 
 
Table 7 shows that Ireland faced labor productivity losses until 1972, becoming positive 
(productivity gains) after that year and even increased the gains in the following period 
(1986-96). Portugal had clear labor productivity losses until 1972, gains in the period 
between 1973 and 1985, and losses again in the last period. This did not prevent Portugal 
from growing at high rates until 1973. Spain had quite a moderate wage growth rate when 
compared with labor productivity growth rate during all periods. It may be argued, as Ó 
Gráda and O’Rourke did, that some inefficient institutions and labor regulations are behind 
this immoderate wage growth in Ireland  
 
These data suggest a limited importance of the labor component in Iberian growth and 
convergence paths (mainly in Portugal), as those countries had converged under labor 
productivity losses (1961-73 and 1986-96 in Portugal), and diverged under labor 
productivity gains. These same data suggest a strong relevance of the labor component in 
Ireland, as this country had diverged under labor productivity losses. This is in line with 
Dowrick and Nguyen’s study (see Table 4), which points out a labor contribution of more 
than 40% to differential growth rates (which are negative) in Ireland between 1950 and 60 
and more than 120% between 1960 and 70. The labor contribution is less significant in the 
Iberian countries until 1973 (between 4% and 9% for Portugal and between -5% and 24% 
for Spain). As the link between convergence and labor growth is strong, it may be argued 
that Ireland showed divergence until 1985 due to decreasing net labor productivity. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
13 See C. Ó Gráda and K. O’Rourke (1996). 
14 This is defined as the difference between labor productivity growth rate and real wages growth rate. 
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Such an influence of the labor component on growth in Dowrick and Nguyen's model may 
result from two sources: (1) the growth rate of the labor force is negative or (2) response of 
GDP growth rates to the labor growth rates is high or, in other words, the elasticity of 
output to labor is high15. We have found some support for this argument in data. In fact, the 
mean growth rates of labor force and employment between 1960 and 1971 were –0.06% 
and –0.05% each year (-0.72% and -0.66% over the entire decade) and shares of labor in 
this decade were near 70%, which is quite a high value for the time. The same variables for 
Iberian countries show remarkable differences. Employment and labor force increased 
throughout the decade by nearly 2% for Portugal and 8% for Spain. The share of labor in 
the national income was near 50% for Portugal and 60% for Spain16. 
 
If we observe Fuente and Vives’ results (see Table 6), it is even more evident that the labor 
force component was of greater importance in Ireland than in Iberian countries throughout 
the period. Had human capital been taken into account, the difference would be even more 
pronounced.  
 
To conclude, immoderate wage growth (when compared to productivity), together with the 
significant contribution of labor to convergence in Ireland, can be a candidate for an 
explanation to our puzzle of Ireland’s poor performance during the sixties. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Despite the existence that very similar policies (protectionist policies and industrial 
conditioning between 1930 and 1950, liberalizing and integration policies after 1960), until 
the 1980s growth rates in Portugal and Spain were high, while in Ireland they were low.  
 
This paper cites a wide range of economic history and growth/convergence literature in 
three peripheral European countries sharing very similar departure points. It allows for 
some conclusions about the most effective or detrimental economic policies, the main 
growth sources and the most important sources of convergence between these countries in 
                                                 
15 This is easily seen by observing the equation (4) in the methodological appendix. 
16 The figures are from OECD, Economic Outlook. 
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each period. This leads to some new questions and possible answers about the puzzling 
fact of slow Irish growth and convergence between 1950 and 1975. 
 
The institutional environment and the market regulations were, indeed, quite different 
(decentralized labor market negotiations, non-state-owned sector and nominal and real 
equilibrium in Portugal; centralized labor negotiations, explicit interventionism in 
industrialization and great external deficits and inflation rates in Spain; labor union 
freedom and centralized labor negotiations, existence of state-owned enterprises and 
explicit Keynesian policies in Ireland). Nevertheless, this did not prevent similar growth 
paths between the two Iberian neighbors and quite different growth paths between these 
and Ireland. 
 
Regarding growth accounting, our survey suggests that: 
• Total Factor Productivity was more important for economic growth in Ireland, 
while factors accumulation were more important in the Iberian Countries; 
• Total Factor Productivity was more important for economic growth in Spain than in 
Portugal, while Capital accumulation was more important in Portugal than in Spain; 
• Convergence effects are essential in explaining the growth paths of these three 
countries and they are more relevant in high growth periods; 
• Factors associated with the new growth theory, such as R&D, Human Capital and 
Fiscal Policy, are quite important in distinguishing the growth paths between Ireland and 
the Iberian countries after 1970. 
 
We summarize below the main possible explanations for the puzzle identified, which are 
indeed good research topics. On one hand the human capital stock, in which Ireland was 
well-endowed, was strongly dominated by non-technical skills until the late seventies. On 
the other hand, centralized wage negotiation (which allowed wages to grow to higher 
levels than productivity)17 together with a significant contribution of the labor component 
to economic convergence, did not motivate an industry-based growth in Ireland until the 
late seventies. These two candidate explanations for the puzzle may be summarized 
arguing that Ireland had a set of institutions, which were not ideal for growth, namely 
                                                 
17 This is also in line with Rodrik (1999), who argues that democracies pay higher wages due to political 
competition and participation. 
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schooling and wage negotiation institutions. This may explain the different performances 
between Ireland and Iberian countries prior to 1970. 
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Methodological Notes
We provide here details on the methodological approaches followed to
generate the empirical results presented in the text. For details on sources
and data we refer to the literature.
1 General Growth Accounting
The standard procedure for growth accounting starts with the neoclassical
production function
Y = F (A,K,L) (1)
where A is the level of technology, K is the capital stock and L is the quantity
of labor. As is well known, the growth rate of output can be partitioned into
components associated with factor accumulation and technological progress.
Differentiation of equation (1) with respect to time yields, after division by
Y and rearrangement of terms:
·
Y
Y
= g +
µ
FKK
Y
¶ ·K
K
+µFLL
Y
¶ ·L
L
 (2)
where g =
¡
FAA
Y
¢µ ·
A
A
¶
. If the technology factor appears in a Hicks-neutral
way, so that F (A,K,L) = A eF (K,L), then g = µ ·A
A
¶
.
If factors are paid their social marginal products (this is almost always
assumed) so that FK = r and FL = w, then (2) can be written as
·
Y
Y
= g + sk
 ·K
K
+ sl
 ·L
L
⇔ g = ·Y
Y
− sk
 ·K
K
− sl
 ·L
L
 (3)
where g is obtained by difference as shown, and the other quantities derive
from national accounts.
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2 Dowrick and Nguyen (1989)
The estimated equation is
qi = c+ a (I/Q)i + bli − δ lnYi0 + εi (4)
The decomposition of variations in the growth of trend per capita GDP
(q − p) is derived algebraically from (4):
(qi − pi) = −δ(lnY ) + b(li − pi) + [a(I/Q)i − (1− b)pi] + εi (5)
where
qi is the average annual rate of growth in trend per capita GDP
I/Q is the average investment ratio
Y0 is initial income
l is employment growth rate
p is the population growth rate
δ is the regression estimate of the coefficient on initial income
b is the regression estimate of the coefficient on employment
a is the regression estimate of the coefficient on investment rate
The Þrst three terms on the right hand side of (5) are the contributions to
variations in GDP growth rates from catch-up, employment deepening and
capital deepening, respectively.
3 Fuente (1995)
The undelying production function is
Y = ΦKα(AL)1−α = ΦALZα, with Z = K/AL and Φ = Zµ. (6)
A is an index of labor augmenting technical progress and K denotes a
broad capital aggregate. The growth rate of A, ga, is an increasing function
of the proportion of GDP spent in R&D. This is the R&D mechanism in
the model. Adding human capital to the model (with coefficient β in the
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production function and the same rate of depreciation as physical capital)
and letting sk and sh denote the rates of investment on physical and human
capital, respectively, the convergence equation (which was also the estimated
equation) can be written as
qit = gx + λx0 + λgxt− λqit + λ(α+ µ)
1− α− µ− β ln
skit
n+ gx + δ
+
+
λβ
1− α− µ− β ln
shit
n+ gx + δ
+ λ
γθi − gx
ε
£
1 + (n− 1)e−ε¤+ (7)
+λ [(x0 − al0) + (al0 − ai0)] (η − 1)e−εt
where
qit is the growth rate of output per worker in country i at time t
sk is the rate of investment in physical capital
sh is the rate of investment in human capital
θ is R&D expenditure
(x0−ai0) is the initial gap with respect to best practice technology, where
(x0−al0) is the gap between the leader and the technological frontier.
This assumes some values in the estimation. An assumed value of 0 means
that the technological leader is at the technological frontier.
(al0 − ai0) is the gap with respect to the leader
λ measures the speed of convergence of income per efficiency unit of labor
towards its steady-state value
η is the speed of technological diffusion (catch-up)
gx is the technological growth rate at the technological frontier. It is
exogenous and constant by deÞnition.
4 Fuente and Vives (1997)
The underlying production function is now more complex:
Yit = Θ
γKαkit H
αh
it R
αr
it (AitLit)
1−αk−αh−αr (8)
The crucial differences between (6) and (8) are the terms Θ and R, which
correspond to the explicit introduction of endogenous R&D and Þscal policy
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as production factors in this setting. The Þrst factor was already considered
in the last setting but in a seemingly different way. The latter was only now
introduced.
The convergence equation that derives from (8) is the following:
qit = gx + β(ait − y0) + λ
1− αk − αh − αr ·
·
·
αkln
skit
δ + gx + n
+ αhln
shit
δ + gx + n
+ αrln
srit
δ + gx + n
¸
+ (9)
+γ(
·
θit + (δ + gx + n)θit)
This convergence equation is almost equal to (7), except for the simpler
speciÞcation of the convergence and catch-up processes, which correspond to
the terms βy0 and βait, respectively. As the authors explain, if technology
diffuses across countries at a sufficiently rapid pace, those economies which
are technically less advanced at the beginning of the period should grow
faster than the rest. This effect, however, will gradually exhaust itself as
each country approaches an equilibrium level of relative technical efficiency.
To try to capture this effect, they have included a dummy for initially back-
ward countries (Spain, Ireland, Greece and Japan) and the product of this
variable by a trend. As the authors work with data on income per capita
rather than output per worker, they include in the equation the increase in
unemployment (DU) and labor force participation rates (GTAC), as changes
in these variables would affect income per capita with a constant level of
output per employed worker.
Thus the estimated equation was:
qit = gx + c1t+ c2t
2 + c3DLAG5 + c4(DLAG5)t+ caGTACit + cuDUit
−βy0 + λ
1− αk − αh − αr · (10)
·
·
αkln
skit
δ + gx + n
+ αhln
shit
δ + gx + n
+ αrln
srit
δ + gx + n
¸
+
+γ(
·
θit + (δ + gx + n)θit)
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The Þrst elements in the equation (a constant, a trend and a trend squared
and the terms which include the dummy DLAG5) try to approximate the
term g + βait, which appears in equation (9).
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